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• Modigliani-Miller: Finance doesn’t matter
• Efficient Markets: Fundamentals drive Asset Prices
• Transversality Condition: No Defaults
• Policy Implications: 
• Basle, Self Supervision, Ratings Agencies, Internal Models
• Finance is a “scarce resource”; Government’s role is to get out of 
the way so that markets can “efficiently allocate” it
Reality: An Overview
• As Coase argued most financial transactions take place outside 
markets. 
• Finance is fundamentally a “relationship” business, not a market
• Finance is not a scarce resource; it is “accepting” IOUs of the credit-worthy
• Default riskFDIC, LOLR to stop runs and ensure par clearing
• Banks operate payments system in public interest; Govt backstops 
• Glass Steagall separated Investment banking from Commercial 
banking and kept IBs out of payments system 
• but shadow banks “poached” and CBs were deregulated to do their own 
poaching
• Rise of BHC, Affiliates, Complex and Unknown linkages, Off-balance 
sheet liabilities and SIVs and SPVs, Counterparty risk exposures 
through derivatives
Causes of the Collapse
• The Minsky Moment
• Minsky’s Stages
• Money Manager Capitalism
• Financialization, Layering, Liquidity
• Fraud and the Real Estate Bubble
• Shredding of New Deal Reforms
• Bubbles, Goldilocks and Budgets
Minsky Moment
• Financial Instability Hypothesis
• Investment Theory of the Cycle and Financial Theory 
of Investment
• Hedge  Speculative  Ponzi
• Big Bank and Big Government Rescue
• Stability is Destabilizing
Boom and Bust
• 1980s Thrift & Bank Crises
• Thrifts and Commercial real estate
• Banks and LDC debt
• 1980s Leverage Buy-outs
• Michael Milken and Junk Bonds
• 1990s New Economy and Nasdaq
• “Irrational Exuberance”
• 2000s Residential Real Estate
• Subprimes; foreclosures
• 2000s Commodity Markets
• Quadrupled oil prices; food riots; starvation
Each follows the pattern and each crisis is worse than the previous
A Minsky Half-Century?
• Stages Approach: 57 Varieties
• Commercial capitalism
• Finance capitalism
• Paternalistic (Managerial-Welfare State) capitalism
• Money Manager capitalism 
• Stability bred instability




Decreasing Weight of the Banking Sector





































Security Brokers and Dealers
Real Estate Investment Trusts
Finance Companies
Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities
Agency and GSE-backed Mortgage
Pools
Government-Sponsored Enterprises









• Rising share of profits and value added going to 
financial sector.
• Layering debt on debt on debt.
• Positions in assets financed through very short term 
(overnight) borrowing.
• Asset mkts and institutions tightly linked in complex ways
• Liquidity and hedges were a mirage
• Casino-like speculation dominates.
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Financial Industry Share of Corporate Profits 
and Value Added (1955-2010) 
Share of Profits


















































































































Total Financial Liabilities Relative to GDP
Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennium Edition (Tables Cj870-889, Ca9-19, Ce42-68, Cj787-796, Cj748-750, Cj389-397, Cj437-
447, and Cj362-374), Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Series X 689-697), NIPA, Flow of Funds (from 1945).
New Home Finance Model
• Jimmy Stewart’s Thrift: loan officer, bank teller, home 
appraiser; public recorder. 
• Loans held to maturity
• New more “efficient” Wall Street model:
• Involves broker, appraiser, lender, servicer, MERS, securitizer, credit 
rater, rocket scientists and proprietary models, MBS trustee, CDOs 
squared and cubed, CDSs and monolines, investors, traders, 
accountants, lawyers, lender processing services; robo-signers and 
document “recovery” services (forgery). 
• Model: originate to distribute, pump and dump, foreclose and resell.
• Capitalizing unrealizable home values.


Real Estate Bubble and Fraud
• Like Shrek’s onion: Every link in the Home Finance 
Food Chain was fraudulent: 
• Appraisers, brokers, lenders, MERS recording, 
investment bank securitizers, trusts, CDOs squared 
and cubed, CDS bets on failure, accounting firms, 
ratings agencies, and servicers.
• Most fraud was on part of lenders, and now 
servicers.
• Fed recognized growing fraud as early as 2000; FBI 
warned in 2004 “epidemic of fraud”.
WHY????????????
• Why the complexity and fraud at every layer?
• Model was flawed from beginning: could not have been 
profitable; interest payments could not cover costs,
• Needed mortgages @ 120% of value to book fees,
• Complexity essential to hide accounting fraud.
• The beauty of a Casino: the house always wins.
• $10T of homes  tens of trillions of dollars of bets.
• Foreclosure was inevitable, desired, outcome: bet on failure 
then reboot thru foreclosure and to hide the fraud.
• Galbraith: The Great Crash. Like 1929 investment trusts. 
Shredding of New Deal Reform
• Deregulation, de-supervision, self-supervision
• Rising inequality
• Falling wage share
• Rising consumer debt
• Fiscal constraint
Wages and Salaries, % of GDP
Financial Bubbles, Goldilocks and Budgets 
• Greenspan “Put”; Bernanke “Great Moderation”.
• No bubbles in sight. Fundamentals are strong.
• Reality: biggest debt, equity, commodity, and real 
estate bubbles in history.
• Propped up by Big Government and Big Bank—No 
cleansing through debt deflation dynamics.
GFC 2007: It all started with Goldilocks
• 1996: US Federal Government begins surpluses; 
continued for 2.5 years.
• Clinton projects surpluses for next 15 years.
• All Government debt will be retired.
• Fuels securitization
• Private debt explodes. Why? The Three Balances.
• The Meaning of Zero:
0=Private Balance + Government Balance + Foreign Balance

Bail-out!
• Fiscal Stimulus $800B.
• Hank Paulson $700B. Don’t ask, don’t tell.
• Toxic asset purchases, capital injections
• Fed: Unprecedented effort
• Peak $1.7 Trillion
• $29 TRILLION cumulatively
Unusual and Exigent Circumstances
• Liquidity or Solvency Crisis?
• Bagehot: lend w/o limit, against good collateral, at penalty rate
• Banks relied on extremely short-term finance, questionable 
assets refusal to roll-over: solvency problemsliquidity crisis
• “Liquidity provisions” through alphabet soup facilities
• Benny and Timmy do Monty Hall: Let’s Make a Deal!
• Treas-Fed Negotiations, bridge loans, “orderly solutions” 
• Subvert mkt processes, force losses on owners, rescue creditors
• Fed’s Special Purpose Vehicles subvert 13(3) constraints
• Lending to SPVs to lend and buy toxic waste
• And to Real Housewives of Wall Street through nonrecourse loans
• QE 1, 2…..3?
Accounting for the Bail-out
• Act of Congress and FOIA by Bloomberg
• How to measure? Peak versus Cumulative
• Peak: Dec 2008, $1.7 T
• Cumulative through Nov 2011: $29,800,000,000,000
• Individual institutions funded up to two years
• 20% “conventional” to depository institutions
• 80% “nonconventional” (nondepository, markets, assets)
• 40% “questionable” by 13(3) restrictions: $11T
• Highly concentrated among biggest domestic and foreign 
institutions
• These figures exclude QE
Select Fed Assets, 1/3/2007-9/2011
Mortgage Backed 
Securities









1/3/2007 1/3/2008 1/3/2009 1/3/2010 1/3/2011 1/3/2012
All other assets
U.S. Treasuries (includes QE)
Unconventional Asset Purchases
(MBS & Federal Agency Securities)
Unconventional LOLR
(TAF,TSLF/TOP, PDCF, AMLF, AIG




































16.1% Almost 84% involved
just 14 institutions!
Why Mainstream Gets it Wrong
1. Financial sector is not operated as a “market”—at least one as conceived 
by neoclassical economics. 
2. Not equilibrium-seeking, rather, it evolves toward fragility.
3. Competition among financial institutions does not promote the public 
interest, rather, it creates costs and shifts them to society. 
4. Management of financial institutions have increasingly adopted practices 
that enrich themselves—control fraud—not only at the expense of customers 
but also at the expense of the reputation of the firms. 
In other words, the shifting of costs is in part onto the firms, themselves—
many of which did not survive the crisis (and many more will fail). 
The GFC and Social Costs
• Safety req’d underwriting; but innovations and deregulation 
eliminated it 
• Originate to Distribute, Pricing based on Internal Models; Pump and 
Dump Control Frauds (Rewards to CEOs, not Owners or Customers)
• Finance moves ever farther from Minsky’s “Capital 
Development” of the Economy 
• Predatory lending to strip equity (Vampire Squids)
• Bail-out rewards “innovations”, socializes costs and privatizes 
benefits 
• Promotes Bubbleonia and Ownership Society and wasted resources 
(labor, abandoned houses and uncompleted projects) 
• Foreclosed property and destroyed ownership records 
• Burdened local government and imposed higher local taxes, pension 
fund losses, falling home prices stall recovery
• Will take a decade to sort out property records
End Game for Money Manager Capitalism
• Renewed problem at major banks could  set off GFC 2.0
• Radical euthanasia: major banks will fail.
• Managed funds will fail: pensions, sovereign wealth funds, mutual funds, 
insurers, hedge funds.
• That is a good thing!
• Minsky’s “simplification”of the financial system.
• Will emerge with little private debt, massive government debt  robust 
financial system; Constrained with new laws, supervision.
• Return to underwriting, hold to maturity.
• Financialization replaced with New Deal 2.0: Higher Wages, Full employment, 
Domestic Consumption.
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Great Leap Forward: http://www.economonitor.com/lrwray/
